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ogy. Concentrating on passenger cars, an extensive system dynamics based market agent model of powertrain
technology transitions within the EU up to 2050 is employed. With a focus on subsidy scenarios for both infra-
structure deployment and vehicle purchase, and set within the context of the EU ﬂeet emission regulations,
we ﬁnd that there are important interactions between different powertrain types and with infrastructure provi-
sion. For example, strong plug-in electric vehicle (PiEV) policy could inhibit thematurity of hydrogen fuel cell ve-
hicles. Infrastructure provision is important for improving the utility of a PiEV, but we ﬁnd that in the early
market it may have a weaker correlation with uptake than other policy options, until the PiEV stock share is
over around 5%. Furthermore, an attempt to install a ratio of much more than one charge point per 10 PiEV
may lead to little gains and high costs. PiEV sales are relatively insensitive at target levels over 25 PiEV per charge
point. The results of our study can help policymakers to ﬁnd the right balance and timing of measures targeting
the transition towards low carbon alternative vehicles.
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EU policy1. Introduction
Electro-mobility is seen by many to be at the core of future mobility
patterns. Electric Vehicles (EV – comprising Plug-in Hybrid Electric
Vehicle (PHEV), Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV) and Fuel Cell Vehicles
(FCV)), based on an electric motor powertrain, offer a potentially
substantial contribution to overcoming environmental problems
created by the widespread dependence on conventional automobiles.
Conventional Internal Combustion Engine vehicles (ICEV), mainly
fuelled with petrol or diesel, have dominated mobility for the past
century. As the transport sector currently makes the third greatest
contribution to global carbon emissions (IEA, 2016) and accounts for
half of daily oil consumption (IEA, 2015), a paradigm shift in mobility
is required. Within the context of climate change, this transition needs
to occur within the next 30 years to avoid serious irreversible shifts in
our climate (IPCC, 2013). In Europe, where transport is the second larg-
est source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, accounting for around a-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle; PiEV,
le; EV, Electric Vehicle–PiEVand
ion Engine Vehicle; pCP, public
MAM, Powertrain Technology
eployment of Alternative Fuel
en, Netherlands.
rison).
. This is an open access article underquarter (EC, 2016), the European Union (EU) is committed to reduce
GHG emissions economy wide by 40% (versus 1990 levels) by 2030
with road transport playing an important role towards achieving these
targets (EC, 2014). Furthermore, the 2011 ECWhite Paper on Transport
set a target of reducing road transport emissions by 60% of 1990 levels
by 2050, and within this to “halve the use of ‘conventionally fuelled’
cars in urban transport by 2030 and phase them out in cities by 2050”
(EU, 2011a). Here, “conventionally fuelled” is deﬁned as those vehicles
powered by Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) only. Consequently, EVs
as a zero tail-pipe emitting transportation option have arisen as a critical
enabler for a low carbon economy (EU, 2014a) as well as for improved
air quality.
Various studies have considered future EV market penetration, with
both short and long term estimates varying greatly (Pasaoglu et al.,
2012), and the IEA suggesting only a 9% global light duty vehicle stock
share by 2030 and 40% by 2050 under their 2DS scenario (IEA, 2016).
This seems far off EU targets, and as such regulation aimed at manufac-
turers to reduce ﬂeet emissions has been introduced (EU, 2014b; EU,
2014c). Currently, only Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PiEVs – PHEV and
BEV), arewidely available. However, as yet, and despite rapidly growing
sales (ACEA, 2016) they have failed to capture a signiﬁcant passenger
car market share and continue to be dependent on support measures,
such as ﬁnancial incentives (Mock & Yang, 2014; Thiel et al., 2015).
One signiﬁcant reason for this is limited consumer acceptance, due to
high upfront costs and the phenomenon of range anxiety (Thiel et al.,the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ﬁscal incentives (ACEA, 2014). In addition, both costs and range anxiety
are related to the current capabilities of battery technology. Battery
costs are reducing rapidly (Nykvist & Nilsson, 2015), but to alleviate
the latter concern policy makers in countries across Europe are encour-
aging the development of an appropriate charging infrastructure. There
are various factorswhichmay impact on the efﬁcacy of infrastructure on
uptake, including increasingly cheaper andmore rapid chargers, battery
capacity and private charging capabilities. This is often termed a
“chicken and egg” problem, as infrastructure providers are reluctant to
invest without a substantial EV market, yet drivers are wary of entering
into e-mobility without the conﬁdence of a reliant, widespread, and in-
teroperable charging infrastructure.
Previous research related to EV policy has focused on themostwide-
spread policies currently applied, which are ﬁscal incentives for users
(ICCT, 2011a; Brand et al., 2013; Diamond, 2009; Gass et al., 2014;
Hidrue et al., 2011; ICCT, 2011b; Lane & Potter, 2007; Tran et al.,
2013) and regulation of manufacturer emissions or vehicle efﬁciency
(IEA, 2008; ITF, 2010; Walther et al., 2010; Thiel et al., 2014). This
research has generally agreed that due to the high cost differential
between EVs and their conventional counterparts, ﬁscal incentives are
required to encourage early adopters to the technology leading to
successful pre-mass market penetration. From a supply-side point of
view, manufacturers must be also encouraged to invest further in R&D
of low carbon technologies in order to bring increasingly affordable
and efﬁcient EV into the commercial market. For example, besides
ﬂeet emission regulatory targets (EU, 2014b; EU, 2014c; EU, 2009a;
EU, 2011b) and member state co-funded R&D projects, the ‘European
Green Vehicles Initiative’,1 has been an important public-private-
partnership at EU level since 2008, funding numerous activities under
the EU framework programmes for research and innovation (e.g.
Framework Programme 7, Horizon 2020). Altogether there are N300
ongoing R, D & D projects with a total budget of nearly 3 billion euros
across the EU co-funded by both the EU and member states. On the
one hand these projects support technological improvements, most no-
tably for energy storage and control devices, on the other hand, through
ﬁeld tests, they address customer acceptance and vehicle to grid inte-
gration (Zubaryeva & Thiel, 2013).
In general, it is not controversial to suggest that policies to introduce
sufﬁcient public charging infrastructure are necessary to encourage the
introduction of EVs (Bakker & Jacob Trip, 2013; OLEV, 2011). This is to
overcome issues of range anxiety, identiﬁed to be one of themost signif-
icant barriers to EV adoptions in many choice modelling studies (Batley
et al., 2004; Beggs et al., 1981; Brownstone et al., 1996; Dagsvik et al.,
2002; Eggers & Eggers, 2011; Ewing & Sarigollu, 2000; Potoglou &
Kanaroglou, 2007). However, there has been little literature empirically
exploring the relationship between minimum charge point provision
and EV uptake, instead tending to focus (for example) on socio-
economic or spatial distribution (Namdeo et al., 2014; Zubaryeva
et al., 2012; Maia et al., 2015) and charging proﬁles (Robinson et al.,
2013; Donati et al., 2015). Although these may be determinants of EV
uptake, current EU policy is focused on guaranteeing a minimum ratio
of charge points to EVs in order to avoid market fragmentation and
ensure coverage across national borders (EU, 2014a). Recharging
infrastructure has been analysed through evidence-based studies,
expert elicitation and multi-criteria assessment for determining the
policy promoters of EVs. For instance, Zubaryeva et al. (2012) identiﬁed
that an adequate recharging infrastructure was one of the most impor-
tant parameters for the large scale deployment of PiEVs in Europe, and
(Sierzchula et al., 2014) have found that countries could achieve high
adoption rates by increasing their recharging infrastructure levels.
Other studies suggest that collaborative schemes between private and
public authorities combining incentives and infrastructure are required1 http://www.egvi.eufor success (Mock & Yang, 2014; Thiel et al., 2012; Rowney & Straw,
2013; Norbech, 2013; Lane & RAC, 2011). Hence, recharging infrastruc-
ture can be considered one of the critical parameters inmarket penetra-
tion of EVs.
This paper takes the EC Clean Power for Transport package (EC,
2013a) as a starting point and seeks to explore what impact govern-
ment policy on infrastructure can have on EV uptake. In particular, we
focus on the recently adopted Directive on the Deployment of Alterna-
tive Fuels Infrastructure (DAFI) 2014/94/EU (EU, 2014a), and the pro-
posals therein regarding minimum coverage of PiEV charging
infrastructure by the end of 2020. We take the approach to identify
what impact policy options may have on long term EV penetration.
We analyse numerous policy scenarios, recognising that single e-
mobility policies should not be considered in isolation as the interaction
between multiple policies is highly relevant. For example, a suite of in-
centives and other demand stimulating policies were employed by
Norway, the most successful European country in terms of EV uptake
(Mock & Yang, 2014; Norbech, 2013). Our approach seeks to under-
stand how speciﬁcally supporting the infrastructural system may char-
acterise uptake within the wider policy environment. For the wider
policy environment we consider supply (e.g. ﬂeet emission regulation)
and demand stimulating policies (e.g. purchase incentives). To do this,
our research employs an extensive system dynamics model of the EU
automobile market, which reﬂects the relevant market agents of users,
manufacturers, infrastructure providers and authorities. This research
is the application of the model, which is described in detail in a Techni-
cal Report (Harrison et al., 2016), andwas presented in a previous paper
by the authors (Pasaoglu et al., 2016). (Pasaoglu et al., 2016) was de-
signed as an introduction to the model that could then be built upon
in future publications such as this, as it focused on only ﬁve generic sce-
narios reﬂecting three market variables (learning rate, oil price and
GDP) and twopolicy options (vehicle purchase subsidies andﬂeet emis-
sion targets). The purpose of this study is to focus on the provision of in-
frastructure, includingwithin the context of the previous policy options,
in a timely investigation regarding the implementation of (EU, 2014a).2. Model overview
The Powertrain Technology Transition Market Agent Model
(PTTMAM) was developed at the EC Joint Research Centre (JRC) in col-
laboration with Ventana Systems UK using Vensim™,2 a leading and
highly ﬂexible software for system dynamics model building and simu-
lation. The purpose and focus of themodel is to study the interaction be-
tween, and inﬂuence of, the market agents on possible technology
transitions within Europe, for each of the 28 member states and across
the period 1995 to 2050. The use of systemdynamics to analyse possible
future scenarios of technology transition in the automotive sector has
been explored by many authors (Walther et al., 2010; Bosshardt et al.,
2007; Gomez et al., 2013; Harrison & Shepherd, 2014; Janssen et al.,
2006; Kohler et al., 2010; Meyer & Winebrake, 2009; Richardson et al.,
1999; Rodrigues et al., 2012; Shepherd et al., 2012; Struben &
Sterman, 2008; Shepherd, 2014; Leiby & Rubin, 1997; Stepp et al.,
2009; Boksberger et al., 2012; Stasinopoulos et al., 2012; Diwaker
et al., 2013). Recent overviews of such studies can be found in
Harrison and Shepherd (2014) and Shepherd (2014). Many of these
have a limited focus, for example on one particular powertrain or coun-
try. At the other extreme, Gomez et al. (2013) focus on a simpliﬁed
high-level global view. Their purpose ranges between forecasting
deployment, detailed policy analysis, manufacturer strategies and
environmental or economic assessments. To our knowledge, the
model presented here is the ﬁrst attempt to address not only the most
relevant interacting agents within the light duty vehicle market (i.e.
automotive manufacturers and suppliers, infrastructure providers,2 http://vensim.com
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petition between all current and future alternative fuel and powertrain
technologies, across all member states. A similarly broad model was
developed by Walther et al. (2010) and adapted by Harrison and
Shepherd (2014), but this focused on the Californian case and was not
as detailed or complex as the model we have developed. Some other
studiesmay have beenmore detailed in their approach towards speciﬁc
areas, e.g. Kohler et al.'s (2010) consideration of the hydrogen fuelling
network, Diwaker et al.'s (2013) focus on the R&D program or
Stasinopoulos et al. (2012) who looked at materials used, but this was
a level of detail not required in our model. Our approach allows us to
capture the complex and sometimes conﬂicting interests that actually
exist in the automotive sector. It also enables us to study the impact of
interacting policies on technology transitions in this sector. Neverthe-
less, the reader should bemindful that amodel is a simpliﬁed represen-
tation of reality and should therefore be viewed as a means of
comparing “what if” scenarios, rather than providing predictive or
precise results.
The model is detailed and complex, containing over 700 simulta-
neous equations and 300 constant values, within 13 causal feedback
loops. When the base elements are combined with the subscripts
employed within the model (such as powertrain type, member state
or vehicle size), this leads to over 700,000 elements overall. Within
the model, four conceptual market agent groups (manufacturers,
users, authorities and infrastructure providers) are represented by key
decision rules and feedbacks. In its current form themodel does not cap-
ture the behaviour of individuals within the system as agent based
modelling could, such as proposed or applied by numerous authors
(Wolf et al., 2015; El Banhawy et al., 2014; Shaﬁei et al., 2012a; van
der Vooren & Brouillat, 2013; Eppstein et al., 2011; Noori & Tatari,
2016). However, a certain disaggregation of the representative agent
groups is partially implemented (for example the distinction of urban
and non-urban drivers) and could be furthered, if substantiated by
behavioural data. The model inputs have been sourced from
numerous publications and expert opinions, but importantly including
Eurostat3 and TRACCS4, and for future transport/energy demands the
EU 2050 Energy Trends Reference Scenario (EC, 2013b). Some key pa-
rameters (such as vehicle demand) have been calibrated to historical
data, and sensitivity tests and reality checks were carried out to ensure
model robustness. Calibration (or optimisation) of values is a standard
approach across many ﬁelds applied to the determination of input
data not readily available (Valipour, 2015; Valipour et al., 2015; Li
et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2014). A more comprehensive overview and in-
troduction to this model is presented in Pasaoglu et al. (2016) and
Harrison et al. (2016). Although we urge the reader to refer to these
sources, some key elements and updates relevant to this research are
presented below.2.1. User purchase decisions
Fundamental to the model is the ability to capture behavioural dy-
namics of the users within the system. At the centre of this mechanism
within themodel is amodiﬁed version of the highly citedWillingness to
Consider (WtC) concept as developed by Struben and Sterman (2008)
and adopted in numerous models since (Walther et al., 2010;
Shepherd et al., 2012; Kwon, 2012; Shaﬁei et al., 2012b).WtC “captures
the cognitive, emotional and social processes through which drivers
gain enough information about, understanding of and emotional attach-
ment to a platform (powertrain) for it to enter their consideration set”.3 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/home
4 http://traccs.emisia.comWtC builds up over time through social exposure to the alternative
powertrain (from marketing and interaction with both users and non-
users), but can also decay as that social exposure is ‘forgotten’, until a
tipping point is reached when the powertrain remains within the deci-
sion set.
The WtC is then combined with relative ﬁnancial attractiveness
(based on total cost of ownership), and perceived values and impor-
tance of seven attributes that characterise each powertrain (Eq. (1)).
Together these determine the overall attractiveness as a combined
utility for that powertrain, speciﬁc to a member state, powertrain, user
group and vehicle size class. The powertrain attributes were chosen as
to reﬂect available information on consumer choice on importance
(Capgemini, 2008; Deloitte, 2011) but also simpliﬁed as development
of future powertrains is uncertain. They are however in line with
more detailed choice modelling studies such as those cited in the Intro-
duction. The attribute values evolve over time in relation to thematurity
of the individual powertrain components that are themselves improved
by technology uptake and the R&D effort of the manufacturer. It would
be beyond the scope of this paper to go into the development of all the
criteria in detail, though it is relevant to note that convenience incorpo-
rates the role of infrastructure provision in purchase behaviour (see
later). The ﬁnancial attractiveness is an assessment of the total cost of
ownership by the user, which includes the purchase price (as set by
the manufacturer and adjusted by authorities with subsidies and
taxes), and a proportion of the running costs.
Combined utilityPi ¼∑A Attribute valuePi  Attribute importanceð Þ
Willingness to considerPi
 Financial attractivenessPi ð1Þ
Eq. (1): Combined utility of powertrain Pi.
Attributes = choice, convenience, environment, performance,
reliability, safety, popularity.
All values except attribute importance are calculated endogenously.
A standard multinomial logit choice framework, Eq.(2), similar to
the approach employed by Struben and Sterman, is used for the assess-
ment of the user's preferredpowertrains (and thus the indicatedmarket
share) using the calculated combined utility.
Indicated market share ¼ e
Combined utilityPi−1
∑
P
eCombined utilityPx−1
ð2Þ
Eq. (2): Indicated market share of powertrain Pi.
Combined utility calculated using Eq. (1).
2.2. Infrastructure provision
The powertrain attribute convenience, which contributes to the
combined utility, represents the access to effective infrastructure for
refuelling or recharging a vehicle, as well as the provision of mainte-
nance facilities (which isn't discussed in this paper). Within the
PTTMAM, the conceptual infrastructure provider group decides on the
type and amount of fuelling and charging facilities to invest in, reacting
to signals from the other market agents and based on a desired return
on investment (ROI).
2.2.1. Charging infrastructure
The convenience attribute for PiEV is represented by the average
population in each country with access to public (slow) or private
(home/work) charging and the proportional achievement of a desired
rapid charging network. Although the presence of rapid-charging sta-
tions improves the convenience for those with the requirement to re-
charge on the move, it does not improve access for vehicle owners
with no privatemeans of recharging. PHEV convenience is further inﬂu-
enced by a weighting of the relative availability of charging and
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backs within themodel focuses on the provision of public charge points
(pCPs) and rapid charge points (rCPs) as private charging is considered
to be deployed in combination with the vehicle sales. The installation of
CPs relates to the expected revenue as shown in Eq. (3), though pCP and
rCP are considered separately in the model. Both installation and
running costs decrease as the number of installed CPs increases,
representing a combination of learning effects and economies of scale.
The required additional revenue (for desired ROI) is compared to an es-
timate of additional revenue frompotential use, determined from an as-
sessment of forecast visits (of forecast urban and non-urban PiEV users
with and without private access) and a presumed revenue per visit and
frequency of visits. Though early adopters of PiEV are likely to be those
with private charging access, as penetration increases it is more likely
that some PiEV users would be making sole use of public charging net-
work. Both pCP and rCP are stocks which grow over time.
Desired CP installation
¼ Forecast revenue−Current revenue
Running costsþ Installation cost 1þ Desired ROIð Þ ð3Þ
Eq. (3): Desired installation of charging infrastructure in each
country.
All values are calculated endogenously, except ROI which is taken to
be 0.2.
Maximum and minimum costs are derived from (Gardien & Refa,
2015; Plotz et al., 2014).
2.2.2. Hydrogen fuelling infrastructure
Similar to CPs, infrastructure providers will add hydrogen fuel to an
existing fuelling station if their forecast fuel revenue could deliver a de-
sired ROI (here, a country speciﬁc calibrated value in the PTTMAM). The
number of desired fuelling stations to invest in is therefore determined
using a similar calculation as Eq. (3). Forecast fuel demand is based on a
3 year forecast stock of the relevant powertrain and annual fuel
consumption (based on a reference value (Edwards et al., 2014) and
modiﬁed by improvements to the powertrain as a result of R&D activity
within themodel). Revenue is based on a fuel cost (Tremove, 2010) and
calibrated fuelmargin. Investment costs reduce over time depending on
the current installed base of hydrogen fuelling stations. In addition, fuel-
ling stations may be dropped if they are no longer deemed sustainable.
2.3. Policy implementation
The PTTMAM was designed to enable to the modeller to create sce-
narios related not only to market conditions but also policy strategies.
There are numerous inputs related to subsidisation and taxation of vehi-
cles, fuel and infrastructure that can be deﬁned by themodeller at either
country or EU-wide levels. Moreover, the PTTMAM includes the most
signiﬁcant EU regulation related to the control ofmanufacturers regard-
ing new ﬂeet emissions. Here, the model structures relevant to the pol-
icy levers considered in this paper are brieﬂy described.Table 1
Initial policy scenario levels (NB: infrastructure subsidies are all hypothetical).
Scenario level R regulatory CO2 target (g/km) P EV purch
0 - No Policy No penalties in place No subsidie
1 - Current 2021: 95 2011–13: 5
2 - Projected 2021: 95; 2030: 70; 2050: 41 2011–13: 5
3 - Extended 2021: 95; 2030: 56; 2050: 27 2011–13: 5
4 - High n/a 2010–15: 72.3.1. Manufacturer emission regulations
Within the model, the current EU light duty ﬂeet emission regula-
tions (EU, 2014b; EU, 2014c; EU, 2011b; EU, 2009b) are captured. Aver-
age tailpipe CO2 emissions of new vehicles are assessed against a
speciﬁc emission target per vehicle as deﬁned in the regulations
(Eq. (4)) and authorities chargemanufacturers penalties for those ﬂeets
with averages above a speciﬁed threshold. This excess emission premi-
um is designed to incentivise investment in low carbon vehicle technol-
ogy, as Manufacturers base their R&D investment decisions on forecast
future emission penalties from speculative demand.
Emissions target ¼ Base targetþ a Average mass−Mo ð4Þ
Eq. (4): Emissions target (g/km) (as deﬁned in the regulations).
Base target = PC 130 g/km; 95 g/km from 2021. LCV 175 g/km;
147 g/km
a = 0.457; 0.333 from 2020.
Average mass = based on (Thiel et al., 2014)
Mo = 1372 kg up to 2016, 3 year average thereafter.
2.3.2. Vehicle purchase subsidies
At the EU level considered in this study, vehicle price subsidies are
entered by themodeller as a proportion of the cost differential between
the subsidised powertrain and the conventional ICEV powertrain. The
effect here is an improvement in the ﬁnancial attractiveness of those
powertrains and thus a greater combined utility that leads to a higher
market share. In addition, having the subsidy in place can lead to in-
creased marketing of the powertrain by manufacturers and a demand
kick over and above the standard utility as users are aware of the offer
being in place, and possibly short-lived.
2.3.3. Infrastructure subsidies
The PTTMAM input for subsidies for infrastructure providers for the
installation of infrastructure is entered as a proportion of the costs for
each fuel and separate year of the simulation. This subsidy assists the in-
frastructure provider as it reduces the installation costs making the in-
vestment more attractive for achieving the desired ROI. In addition, for
charging infrastructure, for which the subsidy only covers pCPs (not
rCPs) there is a default assumption of an authority desire of 10 PiEV
per pCP, as per the DAFI indicative suggestion tomember states. For hy-
drogen, there is no such limit.
3. Scenarios
The policy scenarios of this research have been modiﬁed and wid-
ened, compared to earlier applications of the model (Pasaoglu et al.,
2016). In this study a number of credible yet realistic levels for each pol-
icy have been designed based on this, and an extra subsidy for infra-
structure is included to reﬂect the focus of the study. A table of
sources for key variables for the baseline conditions, as used in the
PTTMAM Technical Report (Harrison et al., 2016) is shown in the
annex. In this research our interest lies in analysing the interaction of
various policy options: CO2 regulations on the manufacturer, EV
purchase subsidies for the user, and infrastructure subsidies for thease subsidy (% of ICEV cost differential) I 100% infrastructure subsidy
s in place No subsidies in place
0%; 2014–15: 25% 2010–2020
0%; 2014–20: 25% 2010–2030
0%; 2014–25: 25% 2010–2050
5%; 2016–20: 50%; 2021–25: 25% n/a
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dy duration we consider four levels and for the EV purchase subsidies
we consider the same level and an additional “High” level, as detailed
in Table 1. All regulation scenario levels, and the purchase subsidy
current and high scenario levels are based on current and proposed
targets (Pasaoglu et al., 2016). The projected subsidy would seem in
line with governmental intentions, for example, the UK government
have recently announced an extension of their plug-in car grant untilFig. 1. Alternative vehicle shares uat least 2018 (OLEV, 2015) and the German government contemplates
purchase premiums for EV (FAZ, 2015). The extended EV subsidy
scenario prolongs the subsidy to 2025. Infrastructure subsidies are
designed to be optimistic and are hypothetical examples employed to un-
derstand the impact of increased infrastructure rather than representing
speciﬁc policies. Our baseline scenario described above is scenario R1P1
(Current regulatory targets and purchase subsidies, no infrastructure
subsidies).nder initial policy scenarios.
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Fig. 1 presents the results from our model for the initial policy
scenarios with no infrastructure subsidies in place. These results will
be discussed in more detail in the following sections. However it is
worth noting at this point some high level observations. Unsurprisingly,
stronger policies and combining policies generally leads to more
successful results. This aligns well with observations from previous
studies (Pasaoglu et al., 2016; Harrison & Shepherd, 2014; Stepp et al.,
2009; Brand et al., 2012; Foxon et al., 2005; ITF, 2008). The “no-regula-
tion” scenarios (R0) experience limited EV success by 2050, where the
EV share is in fact lower than in 2020. The scenarios with a CO2 regula-
tion in place (R1) witness stronger EV deployment with stricter targets.
The tightest regulatory targets (R2–3) are most beneﬁcial for all EV.
Longer term emission targets (R3) have a greater impact on FCV success
than on PiEV deployment by 2050. Having purchase subsidies in place
does make some impact, especially in 2020 and 2030 results, compared
to their no-subsidy counterparts, though the durations tested results in
little variation. However, had there been higher purchase subsidies in
place from 2010 (P4), EV share would have beenmuchmore successful
by 2020, though this impact has diminished by 2050 in all but the no
regulation scenario.4.1. Comparison to real world data
It was felt at this time that comparison of ourmodel baseline perfor-
mance to both historic and future changes would be insightful. At the
time of writing, 5 years of data have been gathered on the sales of EV
by the EEA for themonitoring of the ﬂeet emission regulation directive.
This data has been further analysed in previouswork (Thiel et al., 2015),
and sales shares based on this are presented and compared with our
model results in the table below (Table 2). Bearing in mind that we
are not claiming the model to be accurate in a forecasting capacity, the
results for these ﬁrst ﬁve years of data would appear to be more or
less in line with the sales being witnessed in reality. Although in 2012
and 2013 the model would appear to slightly over-predict sales share,
2014 is similar. However, it should be also borne in mind that at sales
of such low shares as at present it is not appropriate to suggest accuracy
of the model, but as a reassurance that such promising similarities
would lend credence to our later results.Table 2:
Comparison of model baseline (R1P1) to actual data, sales market shares (in %).
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
PHEV Actual 0 0.003 0.07 0.21 0.53
Model R1P1 0 0 0.12 0.45 0.62
BEV Actual 0.006 0.07 0.12 0.20 0.31
Model R1P1 0.006 0.10 0.22 0.35 0.30
FCV Actual 0 0 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003
Model R1P1 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3
Comparison to other studies (other studies data taken from Pasaoglu et al., 2012).
HEV PHEV
Other studies Own Other studies
2020 Low 4–10 5 1–5
Med/base 9–17 9 3–5
High 13–18 9 2–15
2050 Low 8 19 18–25
Med/base 7–25 27–37 24–35
High 11 18–30 16–274.2. Comparison to existing studies
It is not the intention for this model to be used in a predictive capac-
ity for future market shares, but to analyse the relative impact of policy
options between different scenarios. However, for context, it is useful to
see how our model behaves in relation to studies designed to describe
EV outlook. For this, in Table 3 we compare our initial policy scenario
results to the range reported in a previous study that included a meta-
analysis of EV penetration rates from 10 studies (Pasaoglu et al.,
2012). This was the most recent study we could identify with all of
this data compiled, though a 2016 BNEF study with only one scenario
suggested an approximate 5% of sales would be PiEV by 2020 and 40%
by 2040 (however under their optimistic conditions BEV is costs com-
petitive with ICEV by 2022 and therefore is the dominant PiEV)
(BNEF, 2016). The studies included in this analysis comprised of some
with different scenarios (low-high decarbonisation) and some with
baseline/reference only. The table thus shows the ranges for low,
med/base and high, against the ranges from scenario ranges R0Px,
R1Px and R2–3Px respectively. These groupings would feel to be appro-
priate representations of such low-high scenarios in line with the com-
parisons. It would appear that although ourmodel may appear to be on
the conservative side for all but HEV, the relative shares between alter-
native choices seem to be in line with these other studies. Interestingly
this also demonstrates thewide range in predictions that does exist due
to differing scenarios and assumptions employed between studies, and
therefore the lack of certainty in EV sales projections, justifying our ap-
proach to concentrate on relative impacts, though some conﬁdence in
the range of absolute numbers is provided by the previous observations
comparing to real world data.
4.3. Baseline for comparison (R1P1)
Under our baseline scenario (R1P1 – current regulation and pur-
chase subsidies), there is a 5% EVmarket share of sales by 2020, and a
9% HEV share. By 2030 we see that the share of conventionally
fuelled vehicles (ICEV) has been reduced by over a third from 100%
in 1995 and the EV market share has grown to 20%, and FCV has
not yet penetrated the market. ICEV is further reduced to around
40% by 2050, when PiEV have captured 42% of the market, though
FCV has still failed.
4.4. Scenarios with no CO2 target (R0Px)
In comparison to our baseline (R1P1), without any policy in place
(R0P0), conventional vehicles reduce to only 95% in 2020, 92% in 2030
and 81% in 2050. This technology transition arises solely fromHEV cap-
turing approximately 19% of the market, and the remaining EV
powertrains are not successful. Although this ﬁrst observation may
seem an obvious one, it conﬁrms that by introducing policy conditions
within this model we do achieve technology transition as would be ex-
pected. With purchase subsidies but no ﬂeet emission regulations
(R0P1–3), EVs still never achieve a signiﬁcant market share, with only
PHEV gaining a share above 2% even by 2050.When the high level pur-
chase subsidies are in place (R0S4), we seemore clearly the diminishingBEV FCV
Own Other studies Own Other studies Own
0–1 0–2 0
0–4 1–3 0–2
0–4 3–12 0–2
0–2 10–14 0–1 4–5 0
13–22 19–25 7–12 12–25 0–3
21–32 24–35 12–20 19–50 16–23
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generous subsidy amount has led to EV shares 3–4 times greater than
the comparative scenarios.4.5. Current regulation scenarios (R1Px)
Compared to the scenarios R0, which include no regulatory tar-
gets or penalties, under R1 we already see an improvement in alter-
native market shares by 2020, which is more than double of the
scenarios without ﬂeet regulation (from 5 to 6 to 9–15%). This im-
pact is more obvious later in the simulation. By 2030, ICEV sales are
a third lower than the no regulation scenarios, whereas alternative
powertrains now account for almost 40% of all sales, compared to
10% in the previous scenarios. By 2050 the effect of having the regu-
lation in place is a halving of ICEV sales share from the previous sce-
narios under all subsidy options. However, EV sales reach around a
third of the market by 2050, though only the no purchase subsidy
scenario (R1P0) has any FCV sales.
By introducing EV purchase subsidies (R1P1–4), in 2020 there is
noticeable uptake of PHEV and BEV compared to R1P0 (no EV pur-
chase subsidies), resulting in almost twice the PHEV and BEV shares
by 2030, though there is marginal impact from the actual duration of
the subsidy availability. However, this additional share would appear
to come not from ICEV share but from lowering HEV and FCV shares.
At ﬁrst, this would seem to be counter-intuitive. However, on investi-
gation this phenomenon hints upon the importance of ﬁnding the
right timing for supply and demand stimulating policies and analysing
their interaction. The following two mechanisms can explain this in
more detail:
• ICEV purchase price is lowered: As purchase subsidies are introduced,
and successful (as seen in the 2020 EV shares), the resultant ﬂeet
emissions are reduced thereby leading to lower predicted penalties
for the manufacturer or less need for CO2 improvements for the
conventional vehicles than under the no purchase subsidy scenario.
The price of the higher polluting conventional vehicles are altered
by the manufacturer dependent on the predicted penalties (vehicle
price is proportionally adjusted to forecast emissions and penalties
to deter sales). As such, lower predicted penalties result in a lower
conventional vehicle price. This therefore further increases the
ﬁnancial attractiveness (and therefore utility and resultant sales
market share) of ICEV relative to other powertrains, in comparison
to the no-subsidy scenario.
• R&D investment is lowered: Similarly, with lower penalties being pre-
dicted, the manufacturer is less stimulated to invest in R&D as meet-
ing emission targets is supported by subsidised EV sales. Due to this,
the cost and technical performance of EV components do not improve
as rapidly as in the no purchase subsidy scenario, R1P0. This results in
a lower score for the alternative powertrain attributes and a higher
purchase price for them. Thus, the utility of the FCV is lower in the
R0P1–4 scenarios and therefore they achieve lower sales market
share growth. The same is true for HEV that is not supported by pur-
chase subsidies. BEV and PHEV sales are boosted by the subsidies but
this favourable effect is attenuated after 2030 due to lower R&D in-
vestment yielding less favourable utilities between 2030 and 2050
when compared with R1P0. FCV gains no success when subsidies
are in place and this results in a severe inhibition of maturity. As
FCV is lessmature than the PiEVs at the start of the simulation, and be-
comes available later than these powertrains, it is more greatly affect-
ed by the lack of R&D investment. As FCV sales do not develop, neither
does the hydrogen infrastructure, thus further lowering the utility of
the vehicle compared to R1P0. This then perpetuates throughout the
simulation, as predicted sales (based on current sales) are also
lower than R1P0 and accordingly the forecast proﬁts from FCV are
lower. As potential proﬁts determine R&D spend, investment isnever as much as R1P0 and therefore components never mature to
the same level, so sales of FCV remain low.
4.6. Projected CO2 emission regulations (R2Px)
Comparing the projected regulations scenarios (R2) to the current
regulation scenarios (R1), there are no differences in 2020, as the
conditions are the same. By 2030, we see a higher deployment of
alternative powertrains when the projected regulations are in place.
Most noticeable is that FCV has a small market share that was not
achieved in the previous scenarios. The stricter CO2 target and related
predicted penalties for the manufacturers drive decisions for R&D
investments. The manufacturers make the same investment decisions
as in the current regulation scenarios, up until 2025 (the model is set
to consider known changes 5 years in advance). From this point,
although investment in BEV and PHEV is marginally increased, most
R&D funds go into FCV as it has the greatest potential technology/cost
improvement remaining, and therefore provides the greatest leverage
for reducing the ﬂeet CO2 emissions and avoid penalties. The biggest
impact by 2050 of the projected emissions occurs when no subsidies
are in place (R2P0), as PiEV sales are increased compared to the R1
scenarios by around 50%. In all the purchase subsidy scenarios, 2050
PiEV sales are only slightly improved compared to the current regula-
tions scenarios. ICEV sales are more than halved to around 20%, with
the majority of these sales attributed to FCV, now selling better than
BEV. This would suggest that more ambitious, long term ﬂeet emission
targets are most beneﬁcial to FCV. In relation to the previous discussion
on FCV market failure due to lack of investment, the higher targets en-
courage the R&D investment in FCV required to ensure success. In future
work, a closer look at the tipping points to where this occurs may be
useful in order to better set target and penalties in future regulation.
Similar to the previous discussion on current emission regulations, al-
though having purchase subsidies in place in addition to regulations
would seem tomake an impact on EV uptake, particularly in the earlier
years and for PHEV, they would also seem to be marginally less
favourable for HEV and FCV by 2050, and could result in making ICEV
more attractive to the user in later periods. Furthermore, there is little
impact from increasing the duration of the purchase subsidies.
4.7. Extended CO2 emission regulations (R3Px)
Our ﬁnal set of initial policy scenarios considered even more ambi-
tious CO2 emission regulations, compared to those previously discussed
in 4.6 (R2Px). Similar trends observed also persist within this category
of scenarios. There is no difference by 2020 to the current regulations as
there is no difference in the scenario design for this time-frame. By
2030, we see a slight increase in alternative market shares on the
projected regulations (around 1% point for each powertrain), despite a
20% higher emissions target in 2030. Again, this lower than expected im-
pact arises from a combination of investment decision dynamics and
intra-powertrain competition. However, by 2050 there is a much more
noticeable impact compared to the projected emission regulation scenar-
ios. ICEV shares are halved, HEV reduced by around a third, and BEV,
PHEV and FCV have increased by around 40, 30 and 20% (resp.), when
purchase subsidies are in place, and 50, 40 and 20% without. Again in
these scenarios the early addition of EV purchase subsidies can create a
certain technology lock-in in favour of BEV and PHEV, penalising the cur-
rently less mature FCV, though the effect is somewhat diminished by
2050.
4.8. High purchase subsidy scenarios (RxP4)
As seen in Fig. 1 and in comparison to the P0–3 scenario counter-
parts, high purchase subsidies can make a difference on sales, and
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or 300%when no purchase subsidies are in place. By 2030, the impact is
not so great, other than in the no regulation case (R0). Here, the ICEV
share is up to 8% points lower, BEV has a 2% share where there was
none before, and PHEV share has more than tripled to 7%.When regula-
tions are in place, however, ICEV shares are similar to the previous sce-
narios when high purchase subsidies are in place, though there is a 20%
improvement in total EV sales shares frombeingmore competitivewith
HEV, rather than ICEV. Similar observations carry through to 2050,
where the subsidies have also reduced FCV sales, and ICEV share is
slightly higher for similar reasons as already remarked upon. Therefore
with just these simple tests we can deduce a similar conclusion to pre-
vious work that even high purchase subsidies do not appear to have
long term impact, but can stimulate the EVmarketwhen it is in its infan-
cy, which may be particularly beneﬁcial in cases of an otherwise failing
market (Shepherd et al., 2012). Although this ﬁndingmay not be novel,
it does support conﬁdence in the integrity of the PTTMAM.
4.9. Infrastructure subsidy scenarios (RxPxI1–3)
The results of the tested infrastructure scenarios are presented in Fig.
2. 2020 is not shown as there is no impact by this point, despite infra-
structure subsidies being in place for ten years, compared to the initial
policy scenarios. Furthermore, as can be seen, there is little impact
even by 2050 for any duration of infrastructure subsidy. There is only
a marginal decrease in conventional vehicle share that is slightly more
pronouncedwhen the longer duration subsidies are in place. Under cur-
rent regulations (R1), FCV still does not achieve anymarket penetration
despite the 100% subsidising of H2 infrastructure. This is because the
powertrain itself is never strong enough to compete with the PiEVs
that were introduced earlier in the simulation. For the projected andFig. 2. Infrastructure sextended emission scenarios, R2–3, the longer duration infrastructure
subsidies have led to slightly lower FCV shares, as the subsidies are
more beneﬁcial for the already stronger PiEV powertrains. The PiEV on
the other hand, have already proﬁted and similar competing dynamics
as previously observed have set in to suppress the FCV market. In fact,
FCV never has shares greater than the comparative scenarios without
infrastructure subsidies are in place, and only when based on the
highest purchase subsidy scenario (P4) does the longest duration
infrastructure subsidy achieve the highest FCV share. In this case, the
increased utility of the FCV from the increased number of hydrogen
fuelling stations due to subsidies leads to the greater market shares,
taking shares otherwise given to PiEV under the comparative scenarios.
The reason for this would appear to be in the detail at an attribute level.
Although the infrastructure subsidies have increased the convenience
attribute (relative to the base), leading to greater combined utility
(and thus shares) up until around 2030, it is the popularity attribute
(based on vehicle stock), causing a lower combined utility from this
point. This is because the additional infrastructure has been favourable
to the PHEV rather than BEV, where shares are lower (or at least the
same). Once this effect kicks in it begins to perpetuate as the BEV popu-
larity remains consistently lower than the base scenario, causing even
lower shares. This effect has then led to lower forecasts for future BEV,
and thus lower forecast infrastructure requirements. The lower invest-
ment in infrastructure has then reduced the convenience for PHEV
and thus lower shares for this powertrain also. In summary, it would
seem to be that the infrastructure subsidies tested here are most bene-
ﬁcial for PHEV, butwithout strongmanufacturer regulation is not strong
enough to be self-sustaining for any EV penetration.
These results have to be considered in conjunction with the
deployed infrastructure. Fig. 3 shows the cumulative number of pCPs
installed through the simulation under all scenarios. Solid lines arecenarios results.
Fig. 3. Charging point installation.
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based on current vehicle purchase subsidies (P1), there is little differ-
ence when the short-lived infrastructure subsidies (dotted line) are in
place. This is because the PiEV shares are only marginally higher as
discussed above. When the infrastructure subsidies are extended
beyond 2020 (dashed lines), the rate of installation is greater, but still
no deviation between these scenarios is seen until after 2030. Under
the most ambitious regulatory scenario (R3), there is a greater pCP
installation without infrastructure subsidies than any duration of
subsidies combined with the lower regulatory targets. Having the
higher purchase subsidies in place (lighter coloured lines) follows
similar trends, though the shortest-lived infrastructure subsidies does
result in a higher initial rate of infrastructure deployment than the
base, as early PiEV shares are higher. Setting these ﬁndings within the
context of the impact of the infrastructure subsidies on PiEV shares, it
would seem to be clear that pCP installation is disproportionate to mar-
ket shares. In other words, infrastructure subsidies may be successful in
increasing pCP provision under certain conditions, but themagnitude of
the effect does not feed back into PiEV sales success.
The share of fuel stations carrying hydrogen that have been
deployed under the different infrastructure subsidy levels are shown
in Fig. 4. Under the current ﬂeet regulation scenarios (blue lines), as
no FCV share builds up, there is never enough stimulus to build H2 infra-
structure, evenwith the longest infrastructure subsidies in place. In fact,Fig. 4. H2 fuel statfor all remaining scenarios, there is no infrastructure until the late-
2020swhen, in ourmodel results, the FCV enters themarket with larger
numbers. As such, even themid-term infrastructure subsidies only sup-
port an initial small number of H2 fuelling stations. H2 coverage grows to
only amaximumof 7.5%,with the extended regulations beingmost suc-
cessful. Under the projected and extended ﬂeet emission regulations,
there is only a signiﬁcant H2 infrastructure installation when the infra-
structure subsidies remain in place through to 2050 (longer dashed
lines). Yet still, due to low FCV shares, coverage does not exceed 40%.
As can be seen in Fig. 4, those scenarios with high purchase subsidies
(lighter lines) have lower H2 infrastructure deployment, as the FCV
shares are lower, as observed above.
The results reveal that the PiEV proﬁt more from the infrastructure
subsidies than the FCV, and this leads to a certain technology lock-in,
resulting in a reduction of deployed FCV. The lower FCV share again
has an impact on the effectiveness of the hydrogen infrastructure subsi-
dies. This stresses the importance of ﬁnding the right balance, degree,
and timing of policy measures in order to avoid undesirable effects.
5. Sensitivity to charge point targets
Focus now turns speciﬁcally to PiEV and their charging infrastruc-
ture. As mentioned in 2.3.3, the DAFI indicates a desire for a ratio of 10
PiEVs per pCP (PiEV/pCP) for member states. To understand theion coverage.
Fig. 5. 2050 Percentage change in PiEV share and CP installation under R1P1I3 conditions
with varying PiEV/CP targets.
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between pCP installation and market share identiﬁed in the previous
section, we ran our baseline scenario with long term infrastructure sub-
sidies (R1P1I3) several times at different PiEV/pCP ratios, looking at the
impact in 2050 on sales market share, installed pCPs and assumed cost.
As can be seen in Fig. 5, which demonstrates the divergence as the PiEV/
pCP ratio differs from 10, a general observation is that doubling the
PiEV/pCP ratio roughly halves both the number of installed pCPs and
cost to authorities in our model results, up until around 25PiEV/pCP,
after which the target has no bearing on the total costs or installed
pCP. Indeed, whereas with a target of 10PiEV/pCP around 50% of
installed pCPs were funded by the authorities, for 25 PiEV/pCP this re-
duces to 5% and below that b0.2%. It does not, however, have a similar
correlation with market share. It can be seen that as the PiEV/pCP
ratio decreases, both installed pCPs and their costs have a signiﬁcantly
greater and more rapid increase than market share, which is more pro-
nounced in Fig. 5 due to the secondary axis. On the other hand, increas-
ing the PiEV/pCP ratio follows a shallow reduction as PiEV stock is still
low. This suggests that the successful impact on share is relatively insen-
sitive to desired ratio at levels below 5 or above 25 PiEV/pCP.
Leading from this insight, we explored if our model results would
indicate some saturation level of the PiEV/pCP ratio target. We carried
out tests (of the varying PiEV/pCP ratios used previously) under the in-
frastructure scenarios with long term 100% infrastructure subsidies
when projected or extended emissions targets are in place and current
or high purchase subsidies are in place, as well as the baseline (I3, I6,
I9, I15, I18). The resulting evolution of PiEV stock and sales shares are
shown in Fig. 6. The charts reveal the impact of the purchase subsidiesFig. 6. Sales (left) and Stock (right) marover time, which was not clearly observed in the previous results
where we concentrated on three distinct points in time. Both the sales
shares (on the left) and the stock shares (on the right), follow similar
trends, as one would expect. Concentrating on sales, the two scenarios
with the high purchase subsidies in place (P4), have advanced the
take-up of PiEV compared to the current purchase subsidy scenarios
P1. With the highest level of subsidy in place the rate of uptake was
muchmore rapid. The 2015 local peak in P4 scenarios shows the impact
when the offered discount is reduced from 75 to 50%. It highlights the
importance of carefully designing the phase in and out of subsidy
schemes as the market will react very sensitively to abrupt changes.
This effect could be observed in Estonia in autumn 2014, when the EV
subsidy scheme expired (Thiel et al., 2015). In the period during
which the 50 and 25% discounts are in place (2015–2025), the calculat-
ed rate of uptake does not appear to differ from the scenarios which
have no subsidy in place at this point. This suggests that the magnitude
of the EV purchase subsidywould need to be high enough so that the EV
price does not exceed the price of an equivalent conventional car by
N50%. A second observation is that the extended regulatory targets R3
have not only led to shares around 10% greater than their counterparts,
as discussed in 4.7, but also seem to be marginally less sensitive to
charge point targets as the range between the results is smaller. The
2050 sales share bandwidth between pCP targets for each scenario
varies between 16 and 30% for all tests and 15 and 26% between only
10 and 100 PiEV/pCP. We also notice that in all scenarios, there is a
very low sensitivity to pCP provision when the target is N25 PiEV/pCP,
whereas the most ambitious targets of b5 PiEV/pCP, could make a
large difference. The ﬁnal observation is that there is no obvious devia-
tion between PiEV/pCP ratio scenarios until after the PiEV sales share is
between 10 and 20%. For the stock this share is at about 5%. It should be
noted that our model does lack the sophistication of a spatial element
regarding infrastructure deployment, and as such may be vulnerable
to underestimating the impact of public charging post provision, eg
regarding “charging highways”. Nonetheless, our ﬁndings support
evidence that early PiEV adopters are more likely to rely on home
charging (Tran et al., 2013; Namdeo et al., 2014; Hoen & Koetse, 2014;
Plötz et al., 2014; Campbell et al., 2012), and furthermore indicate the
need for widespread infrastructural deployment as EV adoption be-
comes more mainstream with users who are more reliant on public
charging infrastructure.
The ﬁnal step of this part of the study was to look at individual
countries. We therefore focus on the range of results from the eight dif-
ferent PiEV/CP targets for selected countries under high infrastructure
subsidies, current purchase subsides and projected regulatory targets
(R2P1I3). We have not replicated the policies that exist in each country
in reality, but still apply an EUwide policy. Future researchwill focus on
this. We chose four countries to consider, representing different levels
of GDP and vehicle stock growth, as shown in Table 4.ket shares under various scenarios.
Table 4
2010 GDP and vehicle stock and 2010–50 growth for representative countries.
GDP: H N 30 k, L b 10 k; GDP growth: H N 100%, L b 50%; Stock: H N 10 M, L b 3 M; Stock growth: H N 80%, L b 40%.
Country 2010 GDP/capita 2010–50 GDP/capita growth 2010 vehicle stock 2010–50 vehicle stock growth
Germany (DE) High Medium High Low
Ireland (IE) High Medium Low Medium
Poland (PL) Low High High High
Bulgaria (BG) Low High Low Medium
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sation derived about the EU in the previous section, that deviation oc-
curs around 5% of stock share, i.e. charge point provision takes affect
after that point, did not appear to hold entirely true and appears to be
slightly dependent on country characteristics. Our model results indi-
cate that those countries with greater levels of GDP/capita have more
rapid EV deployment (DE and IE), and appear to require a similar EV
stock share than the EU28 level for infrastructure provision to take ef-
fect. For the countries with lower GDP/capita EV uptake starts later
and would appear to be impacted at lower stock share than 5%, but
are less sensitive overall as they have a lower range between PiEV/pCP
targets. It is not surprising that a higher GDP/capita leads to more
rapid or earlier EV deployment, given that EV's have a higher purchase
price than conventional counterparts when they ﬁrst appear on the
market. Users in countries with lower GDP/capita may simple be priced
out of the EV market. It further makes sense that DE and IE would have
more similar behaviour to EU as their average GDP/capita is closer
(though slightly higher) to EU average than PL or BG (which are both
much lower). The countries with higher overall achieved EV shares
are more sensitive to charge point provision, demonstrated by the
wider bandwidth between the PiEV/pCP target scenarios, than their
counterparts, conﬁrming what was said above for the EU also on a
country level. The countries with lower vehicle stock (IE, BG) also had
wider bandwidth than their counterparts. The lower sensitivity to CP
provision of countries with larger stock and smaller EV share witnessed
in PL and BG would suggest that these countries may have beneﬁted
from the more rapid deployment of infrastructure in other countries
that has reduced infrastructure costs. Thus the provider will expect
higher return on investments and install more infrastructure before
the government subsidies are needed (bearing in mind that in this
study, due to structural limitations of the model, infrastructure targets
are related to government subsidies). The ﬁnding that each member
state responds differently to the policies gives further credence to
tailored policies for member states, as long as they are in line with EUFig. 7. Inﬂuence of CP provision (desired ratio of EV toregulations and do not lead to market fragmentation. Furthermore, it
highlights the importance of the interaction between member states,
and how poorer states may beneﬁt from the activities of those
who can bear the higher early stage costs. This can give insight for the
MSs when designing their national policy frameworks for the
implementation of the Directive on the deployment of alternative
fuels infrastructure.
6. Conclusion and outlook
This research has sought to bring about further understanding for
policymakers regarding the interaction between e-mobility and related
infrastructure. The model results of the tested scenarios have
determined the following key policy insights:
Purchase subsidies:
• Even very high purchase subsidies alone did not lead to long-term EV
market success.
• Subsidies beneﬁt available EV technologies in the short term, even in
the absence of other policies.
• Longer duration of subsidies did notmake signiﬁcant impact. They can
provide market impetus in the beginning but market growth beyond
initial deployment needs to be sustained by market mechanisms
other than subsidies.
• Due to technology competition dynamics, offering EV purchase
subsidies before all technologies are available could lead to technology
lock-in and inhibit long-term maturity of less developed technologies.
Fleet Emission regulations:
• Having long term emission target regulations in place is necessary for
technology transition.
• Competition for R&D funds between alternative powertrains seems
favourable for FCV when long term targets are in place, providedCP) on EV stock share in various member states.
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• The most ambitious long term targets beneﬁt PHEV and BEV when
subsidies are also in place.
• Higher regulatory emission targets appear to reduce sensitivity to
charge point provision.
Infrastructure provision:
• Success of infrastructure subsidies is strongly tied in with success of
other policies and existing competition dynamics.
• Charge point provision appears to impact PiEV uptake when PiEV
stock share is over 5% in the EU but would appear to be dependent
on total stock volume and GDP.
• EV take-up is relatively insensitive at target levels below 5 or over 25
PiEV/pCP.
We can conclude that without stringent ﬂeet emission regulation
targets in place for automobilemanufacturers a signiﬁcant transition to-
wards e-mobility, as a potential enabler to meet wider transport and
emission reduction targets, is unlikely to take place, regardless of sup-
portive policies aimed at users. Furthermore, it would appear that FCV
could have negligible deployment in the absence of strong regulation.
There are signiﬁcant interactions between EV options, especially when
vehicle subsidies are in place. Whereas vehicle subsidies are favourable
towards PiEVs, this can lead to very low shares of FCVs, which can be
tipped back into success by H2 fuelling infrastructure subsidies and
ﬂeet CO2 emission penalties. These ﬁndings would suggest that subsi-
dies are only beneﬁcial in the earlier years of market introduction and
should cover all technologies. Nonetheless, our results would also give
some support that White Paper targets may be met.
Our ﬁndings indicate that some form of minimum infrastructural
targets could be beneﬁcial though further research is needed to identify
the exact saturation levels, and it is beyond the scope of this model to
comment on the impact of spatial deployment. There is a correlation be-
tween EV uptake and infrastructure subsidies, but in our modelled sce-
narios it appears to be weaker than vehicle purchase subsidies or
manufacturerﬂeet CO2 targets. Our study results support thehypothesis
that early EV adopters are less reliant on the provision of public charging
infrastructure. Greater infrastructure provision is necessary to increase
the convenience of PiEVs and thus their overall utility as perceived by
the user, but for the user to realistically consider purchasing a PiEV in
the ﬁrst place, more exposure to the new powertrains is required in
early years to build awareness and enter the users' decision set.
Tipping points for regulatory targets should be considered more in
depth, based on the initial observations presented here, in preparation
for future policy discussion and implementation. This could include a
consideration of upstream emissions. Finally, this study has not directlyTable 5
Sources for key variables under baseline conditions for indvidual member states unless marke
Variable Historic trend
Population (Eurostat, 201
Average household size EC, (2013b)
GDP per capita (Eurostat, 201
Demographic breakdown World Urbani
Average annual KM TRACCS (EMIS
Road network length (Eurostat, 201
Growth in oil price Extrapolation
Growth in alternative fuel price Expert assum
Electric fuel cost (Eurostat, 201
ICEV fuel cost (Tremove, 201
Appendix Aconsidered vehicle size/segments, which could offer further insight for
discussions. The work presented in this paper relies on a complex
model. As described in Section 3, the model is extensive and detailed,
but remains a simpliﬁed representation of the decision processes of mar-
ket players. The purpose of the model is to capture system interactions
and feedbacks as concisely as possible and focus on impacts that system
changes can make on overall outcomes, with a view of understanding
the key relationships and tipping points within the system being studied.
The attraction of this is that recommendations for policy design can be
made on the basis of computer simulations avoiding costly policy exper-
imentation.Many assumptions have beenmade to ensure that themodel
is as simple as possible, yet representative enough to consider important
feedback loops. Naturally, this introduces uncertainties into the conﬁ-
dence in the model results, as does any uncertainty over the decisions
within the scenario design. However, the strength in system dynamics
modelling lies not in a prediction or forecasting capacity, but in the un-
derstanding of behaviours of variables, and the comparison of scenarios.
It is important that any party drawing from the results of this study is
fully informed of this limitation. Therefore, the impact of uncertainties
of model assumptions are somewhat mitigated as they are consistent
across all scenarios, and model calibration and optimisation routines
have suggested that data deviation should have minimal impact on be-
haviour. Uncertainties in scenario assumptions are less troublesome, be-
cause as time goes on, even if they turn out to be not as realistic as
assumed, they are still valid scenarios at this point in time, spreading be-
tween minimum and maximum possibilities. Furthermore, the model is
adaptable enough to be improved over time with continued learning,
and availability of new data and information. Future iterations may also
include other under-researched system elements such as differing busi-
ness models employed by the manufacturer or modal shifts adopted by
the consumer. Going forward, much more detailed analysis, focusing on
sensitivities and tipping points, will be carried out over a greater range
of scenarios to reﬂect on further policy options, not just regarding charg-
ing infrastructure but also wider energy and transport policy goals. Such
analysis can be further enriched by linking with other models such as
detailed emission, GIS, power dispatch or energy system models.Acknowledgements
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